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REGRESSIVE SITING OF PUBLIC FACILITIES*
JULIAN WOLPERT**

INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in siting "necessary" but "noxious" public facilities
have been highly instructive for future locational policies.' Public
facilities of the noxious variety saturate some neighborhoods and are
totally absent in others. Those who have been disrupted or saturated
have a valuable story to tell which is yet only partly understood. The
impacted communities needed bargaining power, something to trade
with in a pluralistic marketplace. If the period of advantageous tradeoffs for the majority is over-better transportation for a lower cost,
more energy with less pollution-then we must know from groups
who made more difficult choices-relocation or jobs, protest or frustration-what the experience of exclusion will be like. Their experience is now their bargaining power, a human resource in scarce
supply, which will be highly valuable in the coming struggles over
energy development and environmental quality. The unnecessary
waste of anything or anyone is a waste for us all.
For those who prefer a less moralistic approach, the argument for
this research is based on the tenets of resource conservation. Facility
projects have not been structured to provide incentives for minimizing costly disamenities. Technical and organizational expertise to
reduce the level of impaction was discouraged and, instead, incentives were provided to avoid systematic examination of alternatives.
The wasteful progression of piecemeal projects has only shifted and
multiplied the gaps in public services. Organizations whose primary
functions are the planning and implementation of public services
have generated and nurtured a sophisticated opposition, and resources now must be applied toward regaining the status quo of two
decades ago.
We have made an attempt to document some of the recent experi*Acknowledgement is made to N.S.F., Social Science Division, for research support
(NSF-GS-2758) and to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for fellowship assistance. The research summarized in this paper resulted from collaboration with:
Shaul Amir, C. Murray Austin, Joseph Berechman, William Cozzens, Amiram Gonen, A. J.
Mumphrey, Thomas Reiner, and John Seley, Univ. of Penn.
**Professor of Geography and Urban Planning, Princeton, University.
1. Research on Conflict in LocationalDecisions (Discussion Paper Series 1-20, Regional
Science Dep't., U. of Pa.).
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ences of the "public facility age" and have benefited from many
other such attempts.' Our case studies relate largely to urban
expressways, airports, and urban renewal in the U.S., Canada, and
Japan, but ample evidence extends also to small cities and rural areas
in most "advanced" societies. Our case studies were guided by a
common format of interrogating comparative issues involving the
siting of large public facilities.' The focus was local impaction or its
threat and the framework for study was confrontation and conflict.
The model and analysis were concentrated on description of the
issues in conflict and interaction of community participants with
policy-making and policy-implementation organizations.' Discussion
of the model and its deficiencies is used as a framework for presenting research findings of our empirical studies. The evidence does not
deny the validity of a local negotiation and bargaining approach but
establishes that the hundreds of local instances of locational conflicts
(the level at which the model is addressed) compound to a very
significant national process. The precedent of severe impaction (without suitable compensation by the public sector) has diffused to the
critical point of absorbing any aggregate benefits of public involvement.
THE LOCATIONAL CONFLICT MODEL
The research structure has been based upon a conceptual, descriptive model of how public facility decisions are actually made,
employing a loose dynamic programming structure which postulates
two interrelated components of the locational decision process: the
composition of the facility in terms of its attributes (e.g., width of
road bed; elevated or tunnelled construction); and the siting decision
(e.g., route selection).' Based upon an expanded cost-benefit tableau
of alternative facility proposals (attributes and sites), with costs and
benefits attached to each of the facilities attributes, the comparative
cost framework was expanded to include the incidence of impact of
facility attributes, as well as the likelihood of effective response by
impacted populations.
The model is not normative and not a guide for public action but a
2. Id.
3. For details of the comparative case methodology and analysis of the dimensions of
impact, see J. Seley, Paradigms and Dimensions of Urban Conflict 1973 (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation at U. of Pa.).
4. The model is outlined and explained in Austin, Smith & Wolpert, The Implementation
of Controversial Facility-Complex Programs, 2 Geographical Analysis 315 (1970), and
Mumphrey, Seley & Wolpert, A Decision Model for Locating Controversial Facilities, 37 J.
Amer. Inst. of Planners 397 (1971).
5.Id.
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cynically based description of how, indeed, the process of siting
public facilities has been operating as observed from our comparative
case study experience. The process is conditionally unstable because
uncompensated spill-over effects lead eventually to political recruitment and activation by those adversely affected. Those who have
consistently benefited are forced to compensate more in line with
impacts. Full compensation or progressive compensation principles
are costly and fewer public projects are implemented. The equi-.
librium of full compensation reduces the net increments of public
goods and services to those which would be deliverable under conditions of equity in bargaining power.
The Opportunity Costs of Powerlessness
The conceptual model demonstrates the disbenefits of ineffective
trading power, measurable by side payments foregone. The inequality of trading power is the primary stimulus for assessing impaction
(as the basis for advocacy of equity solutions). Impaction need not
be measured and evaluated if all impacted groups were full participants in the bargaining process. The existence of bargaining power
for impacted groups does not imply a resolution which will forestall
regressive programs, but only that all participants have something
with which to bargain.
Economy in Concessions
An illustration of the concession process, drawn from our case
study files pertains to the 1-95 controversy in Philadelphia." Serious
impaction by noise, vibration, and pollution of low income sections
of South Philadelphia was ignored without threat to the highway's
completion. In the downtown and redeveloped area, the highway was
depressed and covered at high cost to forestall similar impaction.
Concessions were focused regressively in a limited area to insure
implementation. No need existed to disperse concessions in a manner
consistent with impaction. Equalization of negotiating power would
imply potentially a substantially higher amount of concession funding and perhaps forced reconsideration of the proposed route. Active
participation by South Philadelphians in the deliberations, however,
would have been effective only if they had something to trade with.
The actual dispersement of concession funds relative to impaction is
an indicator of inequality in trading power.
6. Id.
7. Hinman, Controversial Facility-Complex Programs: Coalitions, Side Payments and
Social Decisions (Discussion Paper No. 8, Regional Science Dep't, U. of Pa.).
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Local and General Losses and Gains
The impaction experience of implementing major public facilities
is assumed in the model to be purely localized and tangible. Artifacts
of the plan and implementation are the scars of concrete, smoke,
congestion and noise, and the displaced individuals and disrupted
communities. These are the tangible, easily visible byproducts of
supplementing our stock of public services. Neighborhood spillover
effects represent wasted resources (whether in tangible form or translated into attitudes, overt behavior or subtle human perceptions
about the "system"). Inadequacy in measuring tools does not imply
that impacts are subtly felt or largely unnoticed, but rather that they
are likely to be ignored in the development of plans and implementation of projects.
The waste is not only local. Even benefactors of improved public
services lose because collective public action has magnified the distinctions between gaining and losing groups without the prospect of
compensatory transfers.' The record of public facility development
over the past two decades is a wasteful one which has magnified the
scarcity of human resources in the form of social and community
skills. The yield in human satisfaction is less than could have been
achieved. The game was not even played fairly.
Impaction of inner city low income communities has been severe,
but how severe the consequences have been cannot be fully established. Our empirical research did not uncover an innovative and
simple way of measuring social impaction which could be attributed
to specific public facility projects. 9 Are precise measures essential for
public policy, or is the pursuit of rigorous measurement merely a
means for postponing attention to obviously grave disruptions to
social and community life? The measurement of social impaction is
expensive to perform comprehensively and would likely breed a
social impact industry not unlike the cadre who can be hired to
produce environmental impact statements. Precision may be warranted to root out subtle impacts or to assist in the selection of
nearly equivalent alternatives, but gross impaction is easily noticeable, assessible and preventable.
If measures of impaction are necessary, who is responsible for
developing credible measures, weights and constraints if resources in
8. Harvey, Social Justice and the City (1973).
9. Highly promising approaches are proposed and examined in A. Mumphrey, Evaluating
Public Facility Alternatives for Equity and Efficiency Goals 1973 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U. of Pa.) and J. Seley, supra note 3. Mumphrey employs a "utility distance from
status quo" obtained from a multidimensional scaling analysis. Seley has provided a dimensional methodology for categorizing and measuring impaction and its consequences.
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low income communities are inadequate and policy-makers' efforts
are self-serving? Our case studies indicate rapid dissipation of naive
trust in the benefits of public intervention; distrust in the value of
rigorous impact analysis is as substantial as distrust in the prospect of
instruments being developed for implementing progressive changes.
The problem is not simplified, however, by pointing to the shortcomings of social science or policy science methodology. Implementation
of public facilities requires normative prescriptions, sound data and
analyses to provide the basis for remedying laws, rules, guidelines and
court interpretations." The alternative is the resolution of disputes
purely through ad hoc politics.
Regressive Overcompensation
The model has no vehicle for limiting compensation to impacted
groups or constraining side payments to the level and extent of
impaction. Presumably, groups which exert veto power over implementation can demand compensation up to the point where alternative facility packages become competitive. One can speculate that the
only constraint that inhibits such extortionary attempts is provided
by competing communities who will permit implementation with
somewhat lower compensation if the transfer possibilities mesh with
local clout. The implementing organization seeks competitive bids
from communities seeking to minimize the total cost of implementation (physical cost plus side payment).
A tendency to overcompensate has been evident in our case study
experience.'I The risk or uncertainty of non-implementation and
the inflationary rise in construction costs have the effect of forcing
agency compliance with demanded concessions. Compensatory landscaping of sewage plans, forced purchase of broader rights of way
than required by roadbeds, demands for bus lanes and mass transit
routes to accompany highway construction, additional tunnelization
of highways, and to a lesser degree compensatory housing for those
displaced, and civil rights enforcement on construction job contracts
are all examples of side payments which may exceed the impaction
costs for groups which make such demands. Veto power has a
tendency to be regressive so that side payments amplify the regressive impacts of public facility impaction.
10. See Aaron & McGuire, Efficiency and Equity in Optimum Supply of a Public Good,
51 Rev. of Economics and Statistics 31 (1969); Baxter & Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport

Noise, 15 J. of Law and Economics 1 (1972); Bonnen, The Absence of Knowledge of
DistributionalImpacts: An Obstacle to Effective Policy Analysis and Decisons in Public
Expenditures and Policy Analysis (R. Haveman & J. Margolis eds. 1970); R. Haveman, The
Economic Performance of Public Investment (1972); Rabin, Highways as a Barrier to Equal
Access, 407 The Annals 63 (1973).
11. J. Seley, supra note 3.
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FacilityPackages
The model helps to explain the seemingly non-functional or marginally functional accoutrements of major public facilities. These are
the auxiliary facilities, part of the package put together to insure
implementation of the primary facility. These side payment facilities
may take the form of extensive landscaping of highways and sewage
plants, compensatory housing, or a community swimming pool. They
may be responsive to group or community needs, or they may drain
off funds needed for other functions. Side payments may take on a
less tangible form than a facility; a new stadium may be named after
a popular local figure, or promises may be made to forestall future
impaction of communities.
Whether tangible or intangible, concession facilities are piecemeal
accretions which are not part of a comprehensive redevelopment plan
and which may subvert citizen preferences for public services. If the
agencies in charge of implementing major public facilities are well
enough funded so that extensive concessions are available in order to
insure implementation, then little overall control can be maintained
on the course of city or service development. Opponents of a highway may be able to insist that a mass transit lane be provided, but
the public transit system may not agree that the route has high
priority. Developers of a stadium may be pressured to provide additional parking areas, but the land use plan originally promised open
space development at that site. Large scale public facilities have such
massive spillover effects so that they alter the course of urban
development. Side payments cannot be channeled to conform with
long term planning objectives.' 2 The role of initiating long range
development is taken away from local authorities by the piecemeal
injection of large public facilities and their auxiliaries. The model is
partial because it is based upon proposals of facility packages, but
then our cities seem to be developing that way as well.
Referendum Solutions
A system of majority decisions would not resolve the equity issue
of compensation. If beneficiaries of public services are more
numerous and widespread than those negatively involved, a simple
referendum would always favor the majority beneficiaries. 3 Only
12. A. Downs, Uncompensated Non-Construction Costs Which Urban Highways and
Urban Renewal Impose Upon Residential Households in Urban Highways-Part 1, as
reported in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Roads of the Senate Committee on
Public Works, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 1968).
13. See the discussions in M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1968); Mumphrey &
Wolpert, Equity Considerationsand Concessions in the Siting of Public Facilities,49 Economic Geography 109 (1973).
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the imposition of a rule requiring substantial transfer of project gains
to impacted groups would threaten the outcome of the referendum.
Neither would compensation rules be suitable for referendum consideration. The implication relates, once more, to the advocacy
stimulus of uneven bargaining power which is inherent in the principles governing minority rights under majority rule.
The issue of referendum solutions occurs repeatedly in the case of
expressway and airport sitings, urban renewal and conservation
projects. Few of the numerous case studies of locational controversies are solvable by referendum procedures. Court protection for
minority rights appears more prescriptive than recourse to a voting
process in which the majority is asked to deny itself benefits.
The Public-PrivatePartnership
Selective combinations of public and private interests have evolved
to dominate post World War II reconstruction of metropolitan areas.
Presumably, public goods in the form of expressways, public transportation, public housing, airports and related facilities are developed
to off-set the reluctance of the private market to satisfy the actual or
the inducible demand. 1 ' Public intervention leads to implementation
of facilities when incentives to the private market are not adequate.
Yet, public sector involvement is rarely total. Instead, partnerships
are created which are intended to minimize public expenditures to a
point which is adequate to yield a sufficient private sector incentive.
Public expenditures are economized in this way, the private sector
has an additional market and consumers of these quasi-public services
will acquire adequate provision of services with minimum public
expenditure. This government multiplier effect has many advantages
to the participants in the partnership.
The public-private partnership has a number of weaknesses with
respect to regulation of impacts. The quasi-public goods have encouraged participation by the producers but have not developed
stringent standards for client satisfaction. In fact, the partnership has
insulated the private sector participants from the need to be responsive to public demands. Government could potentially have intervened if services were being produced purely through the private
mechanism but government has not intervened sufficiently to augment the bargaining power of impacted communities. To intervene
on behalf of the individuals and communities would damage the
partnership by making the projects more expensive and more risky to
14. See Krutilla, Efficiency Goals, Market Failure and the Substitution of Public for
Private Action in the Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System
(1969).
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implement. The affected communities have little bargaining power
and can safely be overlooked (in the short run) in any bargaining and
negotiation process. To give them some bargaining power would
imply a willingness on the part of the partnership to live with the
consequences of possible veto, demands for proper compensation,
alteration in facility design or other community preferences.
Greater bargaining power can be awarded to communities in a
variety of functional ways. Perhaps the most suitable when major
facilities are involved is via the court process by facilitating some
combination of fines and class action suits, to prevent or penalize
non-compensated impacts.' I The objectives are to supplant the
volunteerism basis of weak instruments such as public hearings with
coercive tools which increase the incentive for compliance with
prescribed standards for minimizing community disruption.6 To
build provisions which facilitate court action and establish a precedent of substantial awards to those legitimately harmed would have a
significantly better outcome for the offended community and
probably for the developers as well. The effect of forcing communities (politically) to recruit and organize, to demonstrate their
legitimacy and representativeness, to commit scarce resources of
money and time, to develop a group of political entrepreneurs is
wasteful when serious impaction is apparent. Local political recruitment and activity is important in its own right, but when prompted
solely by non-compensated spillover effects of public projects, the
local resources are misallocated.
Dynamic Aspects
Instantaneous implementation of public facilities is assumed in the
model. The projects often require decades to implement. An elaboration of the model would require a sequencing of implementation
stages. Should the necessary land be acquired and reserved early in
the projects' development to prevent competitive development?
Should the land be acquired just ahead of the demolition and construction stages? Our case study experience illustrates both of these
extremes even when access is generally provided to the rights of
15. Baxter & Altree, supra note 10. See also address by R. W. Peterson, Chairman,
Council on Environmental Quality, The Citizen: Power and/or Powerlessness, Smithsonian

Institution (Feb. 25, 1974).
16. In some of the expressway cases policymakers and planners were so blatantly neglectful of the impacted community that "white collar crime" would be a suitable designation
for their activities. State and local policymaker subversion, for example, of national civil
rights guidelines in highway construction, parallel closely Ehrlich's theory of participation in
illegitimate activities, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation, 81 J. of Political Economy 521 (1973).
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eminent domain.' 1 The predominant tendency is the low risk
method which is so destructive to communities. The agencies make
the site selection known, acquire the land and hold it in reserve for
many years. Opposition is hampered by the short period available for
mobilization. The community must then live in an area of growing
abandonment and disinvestment, powerless to reverse the decision. A
prominent concession in a dynamic version of the model would be a
"delay." Postponement of implementation would hinder the land
acquisition process and assist the development of opposition.
Scheduling is a complex issue, however, for opponents to understand
and manipulate.
OrganizationalRules and Strategies
Only the pure conflict mechanism is implied in the conceptual
model. Absent are the institutional and organizational aspects of
policy planning and implementation. The model implies that policy
makers are bargain hunters who are looking for opportunities to
provide high levels of public goods and services while evading the
equity responsibility of compensating for severe impaction.
The case study experience demonstrates that planners of major
public facilities are rarely sophisticated political strategists.' 8 The
legislation and guidelines are often ambiguous.' I Purposeful ambiguity may have been inserted to insure passage of the legislation, or
the ambiguity may have been unintended, the product of uncertainty
about actual impaction. The impaction might be expressible only in
non-monetary and intangible terms. Administrative costs of measuring impaction and awarding the proper amount of compensation may
exceed the compensation itself.2
The further assumption is made in the model that a set of clear
and consistent guidelines filter through the organizational hierarchy
to preserve a constant continuity between policy goals and policy
outcomes. This would imply that any conflict over goals would be
resolved at an initial stage of policy formulation. The residual organization would then merely implement faithfully the upper level
resolution.
The implementation of public facilities has been accompanied by
complex bureaucratic settings of rules and standard operating procedures which are familiar to students of organizational behavior. In
17. J. Seley, supra note 3.

18. Id.
19. Seley & Wolpert, A Strategy of Ambiguity in Locational Conflicts in Locational
Approaches to Power and Conflict (K. Cox, et at., eds. 1974).
20. A. Mumphrey, supra note 9.
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the case of the proposed Hudson River Expressway, for example, no
attempt was made to evaluate a set of alternative routes.2 Instead,
an initial selection was made and defended as the outcome of a
rigorous study of alternative routes. Only after opposition to the
proposed route was manifest, did research extend to the alternative
possible routes.
OrganizationalLearning
The basic model is not tied to prescriptive criteria for public
action. In a sense it attributes, because of its reasonable fit to reality,
an efficiency based goal for public policy. Because a model based
upon the principle of efficient cooptation fits well, one should not
infer that the attitude and behavior of participants in the process are
governed by the rules of the model. Alternative explanations based
upon organizational learning could conceivably work as well. According to this view, for example, highway authorities were learning how
to build expressways which a changing political context required.
Transportation and redevelopment authorities have learned that
many of their efforts in the past have been dysfunctional and now
the function, authority and even the very existence of the organizations are threatened. 2 2 Adaptiveness and accommodation by policy
making and project implementation agencies are amply in
evidence. 2 3 It matters little, however, whether one attributes greater
interest in public participatory mechanisms by agencies to a learning
sequence or to a cooptation strategy unless different sets of incentives are needed to induce change in a desired direction. The organizational learning approach does not clarify the goal process either
except in this limited framework of the organization's own goals.
Our case studies are replete with examples of agencies only vaguely
motivated by the objective of improved delivery of public services.
Recruitment of Opposition
The model assumes simply that political recruitment follows the
denial of justifiable compensation, that impacted groups are able to
mobilize when confronted with potential harm to their communities.
A further implicit assumption is that low income communities face a
triple jeopardy: their communities are more susceptible in the selection of sites for major facilities (because land values are lower); their
opposition will be relatively ineffective; and they will have little
21. Anir, Conservation Kills a Highway (Discussion Paper No. 4, Regional Science
Dep't., U. of Pa.).
22. A. Mumphrey, supra note 9.
23. Id., Peterson, supra note 17.
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ability to exact concessions. The case studies indicate that a fourth
jeopardy is also likely: to be ignored by the concession mechanism
may invite minor politicalization but the more likely outcome is a
recycling of the other jeopardies, even to a point of facility saturation of some communities. 4 The development of citizen participation in many low income communities has brought about some gains.
Some effective political entrepreneurs have emerged but such communities are still perceived as the dumping place for unwanted facilities. If minor concessions are granted, then probably little is at
stake.
Opposition to proposed facilities, the negative form of participation, has been succeeded in some of the cases we have observed by a
positive framework of community based planning. 2 This trend
toward decentralization of discretion would be a valid threat to large
scale public facility projects if the tendency continued to grow. The
more common phenomena, however, is that local communities are
swamped by the technical and organizational complexity of impending projects and are powerless to understand their implication and to
develop the most effective means to intervene. The requisite skills are
prominently held by upper income communities who are rarely
threatened by neighborhood impaction. 2 6
Planners and policy makers are required to know which attributes
of the project offend which impacted groups, what aspects in the
legislation, guidelines, and judicial structure can be relied upon to
provide protection from the demands of the impacted groups; and
which technological and institutional rearrangements can reduce the
level of impaction. They must be able to balance impaction-reducing
investments with the alternative prospect of compensating those who
are impacted. The model assumes that such balancing is a part of the
side-payment structure and is solved through cost minimization
criteria. Which option the planners elect depends upon costs of the
alternatives.2 " Omitted from the model, however, is the structuring
of incentives to induce the selection of one class of alternatives or
the other.
Positive Participation
The process described in the model focuses on the issue of bargain24. J. Seley, supra note 3.
25. Id.; Malko, Notes on the Development of a Community Opposition Group (Discussion Paper No. 6, Regional Science Dep't., U. of Pa.).
26. Reiner, Seley & Sugarman, The Crosstown Controversy (Discussion Paper No. 12,
Regional Science Dep't., U. of Pa.).
27. See Baxter & Altree, supra note 10.
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ing power and concessions. The goal presumably is the achievement
of equitable outcomes via inclusion in a negotiation and bargaining
process. If policy-makers could assume that severe impaction without
compensation would inevitably lead to non-implementation, then
citizen participation efforts would be less essential. The presumption
of citizens as watchdogs, functioning only to monitor potential
threats of harm (to alert the courts), underestimates the positive
virtues of citizen participation as initiators of programs.2 While
community opposition groups may become effective in halting
impending invasions of facilities, citizen instruments are needed for
other community development functions. Community based planning is required to attract desired facilities, to see that facilities
already present are maintained satisfactorily and to extrude those
facilities which are dysfunctional for the community. The negativism
of protest is suitably matched in middle and upper income communities by permanent or ad hoc groups which carry out community
planning on an on-going basis.
The model assumes that project developments originate with
centralized policy-makers, an assumption more valid for some communities than for others. Facility projects may originate for upper
income communities in a form which matches the community's
articulated or unspoken preferences. 2 9 For low income communities, protest is beginning to be heard, but proposed projects still
do not reflect the local preferences for positive developments. By
now, for example, redevelopment authorities are aware that low
income communities prefer not to be displaced. They may not know
the goals and ingredients of rebuilding which the community prefers.
Provision for equitable outcomes is meaningless unless participation
in positive development occurs, as well. Stable participation is
needed to allow the inception of plans to develop in the community
level. The model may fit well, but only for low income communities
where plans are imposed. 30
CONCLUSION
The issue of developing public facilities involves more than achieving a known position on the continuum of net benefits, i.e.: how
much improved transportation access with how much noise and
pollution; how much more energy with what additional amounts of
28. Malko, supra note 25; Reiner et al, supra note 26.
29. J. Seley, supra note 3.
30. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967). Remedies, institutional or ad
hoc, must be evaluated in terms of their performance in reversing the regressive trend.
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smoke; how much aggregate improvement in public services with
what regressive cost. Surely these are choices to be made and
theoretical remedies are conceivable which constrain attainment of
these preferences by criteria of equity and participation. The choices,
however, may not be even remotely attainable in the translation of
aggregate preferences into policy outcomes.' It would be naive to
assume that the outcomes we witness merely represent the surface
translation of the public facility legislation supplemented by a "muddling through" phenomena. Bureaucracies are rarely uniformly
bureaucratic-important decisions are made constantly in some
subsections and important indecisions are made in others. The
complex problems of urban expressway design and construction are
solved readily, while endless debate continues on proper compensation for displaced home-renters. With much legislation written by
lobbying groups representing highly specific interests, technology for
subverting legislation frequently precedes legislative approval of
policy. The intentions for involving citizen participation can be easily
subverted.
The required restructuring has two components: the translation of
equity criteria into organizational structures and rules; and the
demonstration that the public-private partnership not be perennially
regressive. If non-regressive public facility development is still infeasible, then attention to the impediments should be our immediate
research and policy concern. The other alternative is to prove rigorously that regression has indeed occurred.

31. Weidenbaum, Institutional Obstacles to Reallocating Government Expenditures in
Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis (R. Haveman & J. Margolis eds. 1970).

